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Abstract
In this paper, a new efficient VLSI architecture to compute modular
exponentiation and modular multiplication for Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) public-key cryptosystem is proposed. We modify the conventional
H-algorithm to find the modular exponentiation. By this modified H-algorithm,
the modular multiplication steps for n-bit numbers are reduced by 5n/18 times.
For the modular multiplication a modified L-algorithm (LSB first) is used. In
the architecture of the modified modular multiplication the iteration times
are only half of Montgomery’s algorithm and the H-algorithm. The proposed
architecture for the RSA public-key crypto-system has a data rate of 146 kb/s
for 512-b words with a 200-MHz clock rate.
Key Words: Data Security, H-algorithm, L-algorithm, Modular Exponen-
tiation, Modular Multiplication, Montgomery’s Algorithm, Pub-
lic-key Cryptosystem, RSA, VLSI
1. Introduction
In open network and communication systems, the se-
curity problems of electronic communication are severe.
Traditionally, the common algorithm (common key) is
used to improve the security problems. In the common
algorithm approach, the transmitter encrypts codes by a
secret key; the receiver uses the same (common) key to
decrypt the received data. However, a problem is con-
cerned: how to send the secret key between transmitter
and receiver. In 1978, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
(RSA) [1] proposed a public key cryptosystem to im-
prove the communication security problem. In the public
key cryptosystem, people use a public key to encrypt the
code and transmit the data to the receiver. The receiver
uses the private key to decrypt the received data. The
public key can be retrieved by anybody, but the private
key is held by the receiver only. By this arrangement,
people do not need to worry about the key transmission
problem, and thus can improve the communication secu-
rity significantly. The public key cryptosystem uses a
mathematical theory to map data in one way direction,
f(X): X  Y, and makes the inverse transform f 1(Y); Y
 X to be very difficult. The RSA cryptosystem [1] uses
Euler and Fermat theorem [15]; its security is based on
the decomposition of a number, N, that is the multiplica-
tion product of two distinct prime numbers. It is known
that a large number is very difficult to decompose. For
applications, the RSA cryptosystem cannot only be ap-
plied to electronic data communication, but also for elec-
tronic signature [1].
The safety of the RSA cryptosystem depends on the
length of the key, usually the longer the key the more
safety the data. Generally we need at least a 512-bit key.
The processing of the key is composed of many modulo
multiplication, modulo addition, and modulo exponentiation
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operations. The RSA cryptosystem is briefly described
as follows:
Let p and q be two distinct large random primes and a
number N; denote
N = p × q
Let us choose a large random number d > 1 such that
gcd[(p  1)(q  1), d] = 1,
and compute the number e, 1 < e < (p  1)(q  1),
e × d  1 (mod(p  1)(q  1),
The numbers N, e, and d are called modulus, encryp-
tion, and decryption exponent respectively. The num-
bers N and e constitute the public encryption key, and p,
q, (p  1)(q  1) and d form the secret trapdoor. To en-
crypt and decrypt, the input text is first encoded to a
number and is divided into blocks of suitable size. The
blocks are then processed separately as follows:
C =Me (mod N) (1)
M= Cd (mod N) (2)
C and M are referred to as ciphertext and plaintext
blocks, respectively.
Equations (1) and (2) are in modular exponentiation
operation and are the most critical operation in RSA.
Therefore, how to increase the speed of the modular ex-
ponentiation is the main task for the RSA public-key
cryptosystem. Basically the modular exponentiation
needs modular multiplication. The modular multiplica-
tion is accomplished by addition and shift operations.
Since the numbers that we deal with are large numbers (
512 bits), it is much different from the traditional number
multiplication. In RSA we need modular multiplication
and modular exponentiation, therefore, after the multi-
plication the modulus adjustment has to be operated, and
that makes the calculation even more difficult than the
calculation of normal numbers. The modulus adjustment
is usually accomplished by range comparison. For real
time operation, we have to use special methods to calcu-
late the modular multiplication and exponentiation [16].
To reduce the time complexity for comparison, a modu-
lar multiplication algorithm based on Montgomery’s
modular arithmetic [17] was proposed by Eldridge [7].
The Montgomery’s algorithm is very suitable for systolic
array architecture [4,5,8,18]. Although the systolic array
has the characteristic of regularity in the VLSI layout, the
hardware cost is high [11,12,13]. Another approaches
are H-algorithm (MSB first) [2,5,10] and L-algorithm
(LSB first) [10]. These two algorithms are the basic algo-
rithms for modular multiplication. Although the speed is
slower than Montgomery’s algorithm, the hardware cost
is lower than the Montgomery’s algorithm. In this paper,
we modify the L-algorithm to calculate the modular mul-
tiplication [19]. The modified L-algorithm can increase
the calculation speed twice faster than the conventional
L-algorithm, and the hardware cost is almost the same.
Montgomery’s algorithm, H-algorithm, and L-algorithm
are usually applied to calculate the modular exponentia-
tion. Like the modular multiplication, Montgomery’s
algorithm for calculating modular exponentiation takes
more hardware. Here we use a modified H-algorithm
[19] to calculate the modular exponentiation. For an
n-bit number, this approach can reduce 5n/18 iteration
times.
In the hardware design of this RSA cryptosystem,
adders are massively used. To avoid unnecessary carry
propagation, addition can be accomplished by the re-
dundant binary adders [2] or carry save adders [36].
However, the adder cell of the redundant binary adder is
very complicated, and we use carry save adder for this
design. In the shift operation, there are two approaches,
left shift (multiply by 2) [2,5,6] and right shift (divide
by 2) [3,4]. In this paper, we use the left shift approach.
The modular operation can be finished by comparators
or by checking the overflow of the adder [5,6]. The for-
mer approach needs more hardware and the speed is
slower. The latter approach needs less hardware and the
speed is faster. Therefore, we use the latter approach to
implement the modular operations. In order to reduce
the hardware cost, the calculating data (message) of our
design are divided into four segments, and each time
only one segment is operated. The time to calculate a
modular exponentiation is 2.65n2 clock cycles. By the
proposed approaches we designed a RSA processor; the
data rate is about 146 kb/s for 512-b words with 200-
MHz clock frequency.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
modified modular exponentiation algorithm is described.
The modified modular multiplication algorithm is de-
scribed in Section 3. The modular operation is shown in
Section 4. The hardware design of the RSA cryptosystem
and the simulation results are explained in Section 5.
Finally we give the conclusion in Section 6.
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2. Modified Modular Exponentiation
Algorithm
Repeating squaring and multiplying are the basic
arithmetic operations for computing modular exponen-
tiation. To compute C = Me (mod N), the conventional
H-algorithm operates as follows [10]:
// The H-algorithm (MSB first)
// Me (mod N);
P0 = 1;
for (i = n  1; i > = 0; i  -){
Mni = P
2
ni1 (mod N)
if (ei == 1)
Pni = Mni × M (mod N);
else Pni = Mni }
where e = [en1,en2,…e1,e0]2 is the encryption key, and Pi
is the partial product. In the modular operation, ‘1’ needs
two iteration steps in e[]. In the worst case, we need 2n
steps to compute the exponentiation. In order to reduce
the iteration times, we partition the encryption key e[]
into several segments, and each segment consists of four
bits; e[i] denotes the ith segment of e[]. Observing the bit
patterns of the 4-bit segment, we find some rule to reduce
the iteration times. For example, when e[i] = 0000, the
computation of M e (mod N) in the H-algorithm needs
squaring four times of M, and e[i] = 0001, the computa-
tion of M e (mod N) in the H-algorithm needs squaring
three times and the 1 may be combined with next seg-
ment. Generally there need five iteration times at most in
each segment. Whereas e[i] = 0111, the operation needs
seven iteration times with the traditional H-algorithm.
By bit patterns of this 4-bit segment, the computation se-
quences ofC=M e (modN) within this 4-bit segment can
be summarized in Table 1.
Let us describe the notation and operation of Table
1. Suppose X denotes the partial exponentiation of M e
(mod N) in the H-algorithm of the modular ex-
ponentiation. In Table 1, 010 means X 2 (mod N); 001
means X × M (mod N); 011 means X × M 3 (mod N); 101
means X × M 5 (mod N); 111 means X × M 7 (mod N). In
the hardware implementation, we can pre-calculate M1
= M (mod N), M3 = M
3 (mod N), M5 = M
5 (mod N), and
M7 = M
7 (mod N), and store these three n-bit numbers
to tables.
Let us take an example to describe the rules. Suppose
three 24-bit numbers N, M, and e are given as follows:
N = 6012707 = 5bbf2316 = (0101 1011 1011 1111
0010 00112);
M = 5234673 = 4fdff116 = (0110 1111 1101 1111 1111
00012);
e = 3674911 = 38131f16 = (0011 1000 0001 0011 0001
11112).
By our modified H-algorithm, e is partitioned into six
4-bit segments, and they are e[5] = 0011, e[4] = 1000,
e[3] = 0001, e[2] = 0011, e[1] = 0001, and e[0] = 1111
respectively. e[5] = 0011, therefore initially P5 = M
3
(mod N). Then we proceed to next segment, e[4]. Since
e[4] = 1000, from Table 1, we can find the sequences of
operation are square, multiply byM, square, square, and
square, i.e.,
P4 = [[[[P5
2 (mod N)] M (mod N)]2 (mod N)]2 (mod
N)]2 (mod N).
Next the procedure proceeds to e[3]. Since e[3] = 0001.
Table 1 shows that the sequences are square, square,
and square respectively. The LSB of e[3] is combined
with next segment. Here we find the partial exponen-
tiation as follows:
P3 = [[P4
2 (mod N)]2 (mod N)]2 (mod N).
Since the LSB of e[3] is combined with e[2]; the se-
quences of e[2] are square, multiply by M, square,
square, square, square, and multiply by M3 respectively.
The partial exponentiation is as follows:
P2 = [[[[P3
2 (mod N)]2 (mod N)]2 (mod N)]2 (mod N)
M 3 (mod N).
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Table 1. The encryption key table
0000 010 010 010 010
0001 010 010 010
0010 010 010
0011 010 010 010 010 011
0100 010 010 001 010 010
0101 010 010 010 010 101
0110 010 010 010 011 010
0111 010 010 010 010 111
1000 010 001 010 010 010
1001 010 001 010 010
1010 010 010 010 101 010
1011 010 010 010 101
1100 010 010 011 010 010
1101 010 010 011 010
1110 010 010 010 111 010
1111 010 010 010 111
The next procedure proceeds to e[1]. The LSB of e[1]
will be combined with e[0], and the rest of the se-
quences of e[1] are square, square, and square respec-
tively. The partial exponentiation is as follows:
P1 = [[P2
2 (mod N) ]2 (mod N)]2 (mod N).
Then the next procedure is e[0]. The first two MSB’s of
e[0] are combined with the LSB of e[1], and the se-
quences are square, square, square, and multiply by M7.
The partial exponentiation is as follows:
P0 = [[P1
2 (modN)]2 (modN) ]2 (modN) M7 (modN)
The sequences of the final procedural are square,
square, and multiply byM3. The final exponentiation is:
Pf = [P0
2 (mod N)]2 (mod N) M3 (mod N)
By the above description, the sequences of the exponen-
tiation are:
3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 2 2 37.
Where ‘1’ means multiplying M1 to the partial exponen-
tiation; ‘2’ means square of partial exponentiation; ‘3’
means multiplying M3 to the partial exponentiation; ‘7’
means multiplying M7 to the partial exponentiation. The
sequences are shown in Table 2, and the results are
shown in Table 3.
By the above arrangement, [111] can reduce 2 itera-
tion times, and [011] and [101] can reduce 1 iteration
time. In the worst case, the iteration times of the modu-
lar multiplication of this approach are 4n/3, and the
multiplication average times are 11n/9. Compared to
the conventional H-algorithm (worst case = 2n, average
= 3n/2), our approach reduces the multiplication times
significantly.
3. Modified Modular Multiplication
Algorithm
In the modular multiplication, the Montgomery’s al-
gorithm [3,4] or the H-algorithm [2,5] is applied widely.
However, they have their drawbacks in the proposed ar-
chitectures [11,12,13]. Here we would like to use a modi-
fied L-algorithm (LSB first) to find the modular multipli-
cation. The conventional L-algorithm [10] is described
as follows.
// Lalgorithm (LSB first)
// A × B (mod N);
P0 = 0, M0 = A;
for (i = 0; i < = n  1; i + +){
if (bi == 1)
Pi+1 = Pi + Mi (mod N);
else
Pi+1 = Pi;
Mi+1 = Mi << 1 (mod N); }
Where Pi is the partial product, and B = [bn1,bn-2,….,
b1,b0]2. The L-algorithm calculates the modular multi-
plication by checking the multiplier, B, from the LSB
bit by bit toward the MSB. By this approach, an nbit
number needs n iteration times. We modify the L-algo-
rithm by scanning two bits a time instead of one bit from
LSB toward MSB of the multiplier B. Therefore; the it-
eration times can be reduced to only half of the tradi-
tional L-algorithm (the upper bound is n/2). The modi-
fied L-algorithm is described as follows.
// Modified L-algorithm
// A × B (mod N);
P0 = 0, M0 = A, s = 0, c = 0;
for (i = 0; i < =  n/2  ; i + +){
s = b2i+1× 2 + b2i + c, c =  s/4 ;
switch(s[1:0]){
case 3:
c = c + 1;
Pi+1 = (Pi + (Mi)) (mod N);
Mi+1 = (Mi × 4)(mod N);
case 2:
Mi+1 = (Mi × 2) (mod N);
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Table 2. Sequences of the partial exponentiation
e[5] e[4] e[3] e[2] e[1] e[0]
P5 0011 1000 0001 0011 0001 11112 3
P4 0011 1000 0001 0011 0001 11112 2 1 2 2 2
P3 0011 1000 0001 0011 0001 11112 2 2 2
P2 0011 1000 0001 0011 0001 11112 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
P1 0011 1000 0001 0011 0001 11112 2 2 2
P0 0011 1000 0001 0011 0001 11112 2 2 2 7
Pf 0011 1000 0001 0011 0001 11112 2 2 3
Table 3. Results ofC = Me (mod N), with N = 5bbf2316,M = 4fdff116,
and e = 38131f16
M1 17ccd216
M3 37660c16
M5 5d68216
M7 2a1d8c 16
Pi+1 = (Pi + Mi+1) (mod N);
Mi+1 = (Mi+1 × 2) (mod N);
case 1:
Pi+1 = (Pi + Mi) (mod N);
Mi+1 = (Mi × 4) (mod N);
case 0:
Pi+1 = Pi;
Mi+1 = (Mi × 4) (mod N);
} }
Table 4 lists the clock cycles that are needed to per-
form the modular multiplication of n-bit numbers with
different algorithms.
4. Modular Operation
In order to increase the speed of the modular opera-
tion, carry save adders are used in this RSA processor. In
the hardware point of view, if the sum of the addition over-
flows, the modulus adjustment has to be proceeded. Oth-
erwise, no modulus adjustment needs to be done. There
are four cases of sums may cause overflow, and they are
2n, 2 × 2n, 3 × 2n and 4 × 2n respectively. These four num-
bers can be precalculated and let us denote these four
numbers as k1, k2, k3 and k4 respectively, and they are:
k1  2n(mod N),
k2  2n+1(mod N),
k3  3 × 2n(mod N),
k4  2n+2(mod N).
The overflow can be determined by checking C(S)n+1,
Cn, and Sn of the carry save adder and the values are
shown in Table 5. If overflow occurs, k1, k2, k3 or k4 has
to be added to the sum to finish the modulus compensa-
tion.
By the overflow checking method, it is very easy to im-
plement modulo operations, and the speed can be in-
creased.
In the modular exponentiation and multiplication,
(–Mi) (mod N) is needed in our modified L-algorithm.
For simplicity we do not deal with negative numbers in
the modular operation. Mathematically the value of
(–Mi) (mod N) can be calculated by adding a number of
multiples of N to –Mi and make it to be positive. The
range of Mi is as follows:
0 < Mi = CMi + SMi < 2 × 2
n + 2n = 3 × 2n
When there is an overflow, i.e. c = 1, we have to add a
number k6 in the range of 3 × 2n < k6 < 4 × 2n, that is mul-
tiple of N. Therefore, the range of (k6  Mi) can be found
as follows:
2n  Mi < 3 × 2
n
3 × 2n < Mi  2
n (3)
0 < k6  Mi < 3 × 2
n
On the other hand, if there is no overflow, i.e. c = 0, we
can add number k5 in the range of 2 × 2n < k5 < 3 × 2n,
which is multiple of N to the sum, and the range of (k5 
Mi1) can be found as follows:
0 < Mi < 2 × 2
n
2n+1 < Mi < 0 (4)
0 < k5  Mi < 3 × 2
n
Equations (3) and (4) are within the range of the carry
save adder, and therefore these two numbers, (k6  Mi)
and (k5  Mi), can be used in next step and no modular
adjustment is needed. Since N is known, the values of
k5 and k6 can be precalculated.
5. Hardware Design
The main operation of the modular multiplier is addi-
tion, and carry save adders are commonly used to avoid
unnecessary carry propagation delays [36]. In this mod-
ular multiplier, there are five units. The first unit is “Par-
tial Product Adder” to find the partial product; the second
unit is “Summand Generator” to generate the summand
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Table 4. Clock cycles needed for modular multiplication
Algorithm Each addition Each multiplication
Montgomery 2 3n *
H-algorithm 3 4n *
L-algorithm 3 3n
Ours 4 2n
*Include the addition for next multiplication.
Table 5. Overflow vs. k value
C(S)n+1 Cn Sn k
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 k12n(mod N)
0 1 0 k12n(mod N)
0 1 1 k22n+1(mod N)
1 0 0 k22n+1(mod N)
1 0 1 k332n(mod N)
1 1 0 k332n(mod N)
1 1 1 k42n+2(mod N)
for the partial product; the third unit is “Shift Register”;
the fourth unit is “Table”, and the last unit is “Control-
ler”. In order to reduce the hardware cost, the message is
partitioned into four segments in the RSA processor. For
an n-bit message there are n/4 bits in each stage, and we
need four clocks to finish each iteration of the modular
multiplication. In the modified L-algorithm as men-
tioned above, two bits are scanned each time, and this
2-bit number can decide 0, A, 2A or A that will be added
to the partial product. These four cases are summarized
in Table 6. The details of the hardware units are illus-
trated in the following subsections.
5.1. Summand Generator (SG)
The block diagram of the Summand Generator (SG)
is shown in Figure 1. The inputs are k1 ~ k6, Carryin,
Sumin, and the control signal flag; the outputs are
A(Carry), A(Sum), A(Carry), A(Sum), 2A(Carry), and
2A (Sum). These outputs are applied to find the partial
product. There are three carry save adders in the SG, and
they are pipelined in four stages. According to Figure 1,
CSA2 tries to finish Carry2 + Sum2 =  (Carry1 +
Sum1)/2  (mod N);
CSA4 tries to finish Carry4 + Sum4 =  (Carry3 +
Sum3)/2  (mod N);
CSAB tries to finish Carryb + Sumb =  (Carry1 +
Sum1)/2  (mod N).
By this arrangement, the cycle time of the SG is only
one delay of the FA.
5.2. Partial Product Adder (PPA)
The block diagram of the Partial Product Adder (PPA)
is shown in Figure 2. There are three steps to find the par-
tial product, and they are pipelined in four stages. We use
three n/4 - bit carry save adders in this unit. Carry save ad-
der CSAP1 finishes Pi+1 = Pi + SCarry; carry save adder
CSAP2 finishes Pi+1 = Pi + SCarry + SSum; carry save ad-
der CSAP3 finishes Pi+1 = Pi+1 (mod N).
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Table 6. Summand factor
S Summand
00 0
01 A
10 2A
11 A
Carry4
Carry3
Carry1
Carry2
CSA4 4A mod N CSA2 2A mod N
MUX
Carryin Sumin
CSAB -A mod N
add1add2 addb
A (Carry)
-A (Carry)
2A (Carry)
A (Sum)
-A (Sum)
2A (Sum)
flag
Sum4 Sum1
Sum2Sum3
Figure 1. Summand generator.
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Carryp4
Carryp3
Carryp1
Carryp2
CSAP3 P
i+1
mod N CSAP1 P
i
+ SCarry
MUX
0 0
CSAP2 P
i
+ SSum
flag
M
U
X
S
S
u
m
0
A(C)
2A(C)
-A(C)
0
A(S)
2A(S)
-A(S)
add3
S
C
arry
S
S
u
m
r
s
Sump4 Sump1
Sump3 Sump2
Figure 2. Partial product adder.
k6k5k4k3k2k1
M7M5M3M1
shc2shc3
shc1
MUX
Carrp4 Sump4 datain control
>> 2
shc4
shs3
shs1
shs2
shs4
Figure 3. Tables and shift register.
To compute the partial product in the correct range,
the summands of the final modular multiplication are set
to zero.
5.3. Table and Shift Register
Figure 3 shows the block diagram of Table and Shift
Register. The Table block stores precalculated values of
M1, M3, M5, M7, and k1 ~ k6. While Shift Register is
used to store B and put M1, M3, M5, M7, and k1 ~ k6 to
the Table. Where B is the initial output of the partial
product in each modular multiplication.
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dataout(s)
datain
Table and Shift Register Controller
Partial Product Adder
Summand Generator
Figure 4. RSA processor.
Table 7. Features of our RSA chip
Design Tool Verilog-XL
Synthesis Tool Synopsys
Technology Cell Library Compass Standard Cell Library
Process Technology TSMC 0.6 m 1P3M Process
Power Supply 5 V
Gate Counts (2 input NAND) 80550
Die Size 5304.0 m  5356.8 m
I/O 20-bit parallel, synchronous
Baud Rate (512-bit) 146 kbits/s with 200 MHz (worst case)
Voltage 5 V
Power consumption N/A
Figure 5. VLSI Layout of the 512-bit RSA chip.
Table 8. Features of four RSA chips
Victor [20] NTT [21] Chen [22] This Chip
Clock Speed 25 MHz 40 MHz 50 MHz 200 MHz
Baud rate Per 512 bits 100 K 20 K 24.3 K 146 K
Clock Cycles Per512Bits Encryption 0.125 M 1 M 1.05 M 0.7 M
Technology 1 m 0.5 m 0.8 m 0.6 m
Bits Per Chip 512 1024 512 512
Gate Counts 75 K 105 K 78 K 80 K
5.4. RSA Processor
Figure 4 shows the architecture of the RSA processor.
We use Compass standard cell library (TSMC 0.6um
process) to design a 512-bit RSA processor. The design
is simulated by Compass ISM (input slope model) delay
model. The simulation results show that the critical path
delay is only 5ns, and the chip can operate up to 200-
MHz clock. The processor delivers a baud rate of 146
kbits/s in the worst case. The features of our RSA proces-
sor are shown in Table 7, and the features of four RSA
chips are shown in Table 8. Otherwise, Figure 5 shows
the layout of the RSA chip.
The comparisons of hardware requirement and time
complexity of the mentioned algorithms are listed in Ta-
bles 9 and 10 respectively. From the comparisons, the
hardware of our architecture is small; the speed is reason-
able, and the areatime product is very good.
6. Conclusion
We propose two methods to speed up the operation
for modular exponentiations and modular multiplica-
tion respectively. The modified H-algorithm for mod-
ular exponentiation reduces the number of modular
multiplication to 4n/3. The modified L-algorithm for
the modular multiplication reduces the operation times
to half of the original L-algorithm and Montgomery’s
algorithm. In order to reduce the hardware require-
ment, only n/4 bits are executed in each stage of the
proposed RSA processor. For the reduction of modular
operation, we use the idea of replacing the overflow
sum with the equivalent values that are precomputed,
and thus no comparison with the modulus (N) is
needed. Based on the algorithm, this RSA processor
can achieve high performance. The simulation results
show that the critical path delay is only 5ns. In the
worst case, the architecture takes 0.7 M clock cycles to
finish the modular exponentiation (512-bit modulus
and 512-bit exponent). The processor delivers a baud
rate of 146 kbits/s with 200-MHz clock frequency in
the worst case.
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